Understanding "Conservative Internationalism"
"Barbary pirates. Jefferson became familiar with the raids of Barbary pirates in the Mediterranean when he was ambassador to France in the 1780s. He supported the founding of the U.S. Navy in the 1790s precisely to deal with this threat. Four Barbary states — Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli — repeatedly raided European and American shipping and demanded payments to desist from doing so. No sooner had Jefferson become president in March 1801 than the pasha at Tripoli raised new demands. What conceivable material threat this distant harassment posed to the United States is hard to imagine. Yet Jefferson in May 1801 immediately dispatched Commodore Richard Dale and three American frigates plus an armed schooner to defend American shipping. At the time, this contingent made up half the U.S. Navy. He did so even though he had not yet appointed a secretary of the navy (his first four nominees refused the job, some not once but twice) and defense spending had been reduced by two-thirds from $6 million in 1799 to $1.9 million in 1801. This was not the action of a pacifist or realist, since it implied a military action of choice not necessity, and it stretched American naval resources beyond anticipated limits. What would the United States do now if enemy raiders intercepted U.S. ships and impressed its seamen closer to American shores? The conflict with the Barbary states dragged on for four years, absorbing most of the U.S. Navy. As Henry Adams noted, 'with the exception of the frigates ‘Chesapeake’ and ‘United States’, hardly a seagoing vessel was left at home.'"
Henry Nau, at Policy Review, explains.
Henry Nau, at Policy Review, explains.
I started this last night, and I'm about a third of the way through it.
I've already decided that it's as important, in its way, as Norman Podhoretz's 2003 essay, World War IV, which of course he turned into a 240-page book. I hope Henry Nau will consider doing the same.
Thanks for posting this.
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